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BULK TELEPHONY METADATA
COLLECTION AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: THE CASE FOR
REVISITING THE THIRD-PARTY
DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE IN THE
DIGITAL AGE
TIMOTHY J. GEVERD*
“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”1

INTRODUCTION
On June 5, 2013, Glenn Greenwald of The Guardian reported on
leaked National Security Agency (“NSA”) documents revealing that the
Agency was “collecting the telephone records of millions of US customers. . . under a top secret order issued in April.” 2 On June 9, 2013, The
Guardian released the identity of the source of the NSA leaks as Edward Snowden.3 Snowden, claiming that the NSA surveillance programs “pose[] „an existential threat to democracy,‟”4 leaked the top secret documents in order “„ . . . to inform the public as to that which is

*
Law Clerk, The Honorable B. Avant Edenfield, United States District Court for
the Southern District of Georgia (2014-15 Term). Special thanks to Dean Craig Lerner of
George Mason University School of Law for his invaluable insight throughout the writing
of this Article and to my good friend Joseph Oliveri for his thoughtful edits and comments. All views expressed here are my own, as are any errors.
1. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
2. Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013) [hereinafter Greenwald, Verizon],
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order.
3. Glenn Greenwald, Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblowersurveillance.
4.
Id.
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done in their name and that which is done against them‟”—i.e., government use of dragnet surveillance to destroy “basic liberties.”5 Snowden recently appeared by videoconference at the South by Southwest
Conference in Austin, Texas.6 When asked if he would leak the details
of the NSA surveillance programs again if given the chance, Snowden
responded, “„Absolutely yes,” and added “that he „took an oath to support and defend the Constitution and [he] saw the Constitution . . . being violated on a massive scale.‟”7 However, it is far from clear that the
NSA‟s surveillance programs do indeed violate the Constitution under
current Fourth Amendment principles.
Despite the Fourth Amendment‟s guarantee that “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,” 8 the United
States Supreme Court “consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over to
third parties.”9 Thus, information disclosed to third parties falls outside
of the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Under this third-party disclosure doctrine, the Court has held that the phone numbers one dials
are beyond the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. 10 Similarly,
lower federal courts have applied the third-party disclosure doctrine to
power records produced by utility companies,11 to records kept by Inter-

5. Id.
6. E.g., Brandon Griggs & Doug Gross, Edward Snowden Speaks at SXSW, Calls
for Public Oversight of U.S. Spy Programs, CNN (Mar. 10, 2014, 8:39 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/10/tech/web/edward-snowden-sxsw (noting that “[t]he event
marked the first time the former National Security Agency contractor . . . directly addressed people in the United States since he fled the country with thousands of secret
documents”).
7. Mark Memmott, Edward Snowden Tells SXSW He‟d Leak Those Secrets Again,
NPR (Mar. 10, 2014, 12:11 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2014/03/10/288601356/live-edward-snowden-speaks-to-sxsw.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. E.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (citing cases). Lower federal courts continue to cite Smith approvingly. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Lopez,
670 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[O]btaining [a phone number] from the phone company
isn‟t a search because by subscribing to the telephone service the user of the phone is
deemed to surrender any privacy interest he may have had in his number.”).
10. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46.
11. E.g., United States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107, 1111-12 (8th Cir. 2011); see also
United States v. Porco, 842 F. Supp. 1393, 1398 (D. Wyo. 1994) (“[T]he defendants had no
legitimate expectation of privacy in Rural Electric records of the electrical usage at their
residence,” because they “chose to use electricity provided by Rural Electric and knew that
their electrical usage was monitored by Rural Electric in order to generate a monthly
bill”).
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net Service Providers (“ISPs”), 12 and to credit card information.13
The third-party disclosure doctrine thus clears the way for broad
surveillance programs like the ones Edward Snowden leaked, capturing
the attention of the American people and the world. Lack of constitutional protection for such information certainly is cause for alarm in today‟s digital world. Simply put, “your privacy is not Fourth Amendment
safe” in the digital age.14 For many years, electronic surveillance has
been beyond the reach of federal courts, because “[o]nce [information is]
disclosed, that is the end of the privacy inquiry, and the result is that
privacy protection is lost” regardless of “the circumstances surrounding
that disclosure.”15 However, in the wake of the Edward Snowden leaks,
federal courts will be forced to consider the continued vitality of the
third-party disclosure doctrine in today‟s technological age. 16
Thus far, three United States District Courts have considered the
legality of the NSA‟s bulk data collection and have reached conflicting

12. E.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding
that “computer surveillance techniques that reveal the to/from addresses of e-mail messages, the IP addresses of websites visited and the total amount of data transmitted to or
from an account” is “constitutionally indistinguishable from the use of a pen register that
the Court approved in Smith”); see also, e.g., United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196,
1204 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Every federal court to address [Fourth Amendment protection of
Internet subscriber information] has held that subscriber information provided to an internet provider is not protected by the Fourth Amendment‟s privacy expectation.” (citing
cases)).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Alabi, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1207 (D.N.M. 2013) (“The
government‟s scan of credit card and debit cards‟ magnetic strips is . . . not a Fourth
Amendment search under the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy approach . . . , because . . . given that the electronically stored account information is necessarily disclosed
to private parties when credit and debit cards are used as intended, the scan does not implicate a legitimate privacy interest.”).
14. See Grover G. Norquist & Laura Murphy, Opinion, A Fourth Amendment Application for the Internet, POLITICO (Mar. 17, 2013, 9:40 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/03/grover-norquist-laura-murphy-a-fourthamendment-application-for-the-internet-88955.html.
15. Samuel Mark Borowski, Aaron Midler & Pervin Taleyarkhan, Evolving Technology & Privacy Law: Can the Fourth Amendment Catch Up?, ABA SCITECH LAW.,
Spring 2012, at 14, 16.
16. See Brendan Sasso, Snowden Leaks Help NSA Critics in Government Surveillance Lawsuits, THEHILL (Sept. 21, 2013, 9:27 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hilliconvalley/technology/323793-snowden-leaks-help-nsa-critics-in-legal-fights (noting that the
Snowden leaks “eroded the government‟s key legal defense and could mean that questions
over whether the National Security Agency is breaking the law will be decided in open
court”); see also Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Soon after the
[Snowden leaks] in the news media, plaintiffs filed their complaints . . . alleging that the
Government, with participation of private companies, is conducting „a secret and illegal
government scheme to intercept and analyze vast quantities of domestic telephonic communications,” and “of communications from the Internet and electronic service providers.”
(internal citations omitted)).
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conclusions.17 Three United States Courts of Appeals have since heard
oral argument on the constitutionality of the bulk telephony collection
program.18 This Article argues that federal courts should seize the opportunity presented by the Snowden leaks to reexamine the continued
vitality of the current third-party disclosure doctrine in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Specifically, this Article argues that Smith
v. Maryland19 simply cannot continue to act as the “North Star” for
judges navigating the “Fourth Amendment waters” of the digital age, 20
and that instead, Smith should apply more narrowly in the digital age.
In so arguing, this Article advocates that courts apply a modified, twostep test to evaluating third-party disclosures rather than applying the
traditional binary rubric that courts have drawn from Smith and United States v. Miller21—i.e., if information is disclosed, that information is
unprotected. Thus, this Article suggests that courts ask, first, what individuals reasonably expect the scope of their disclosure to be and, second, whether a particular surveillance program is capable of revealing
information beyond what those individuals reasonably expected to reveal. If the technology reveals information beyond that which individuals reasonably expected to reveal, then the use of such technology implicates the Fourth Amendment.
Part I of this Article introduces and discusses the Court‟s thirdparty disclosure doctrine as it applies to Fourth Amendment analysis.
Part II then discusses Congressional regulation of electronic surveillance and introduces the NSA bulk telephony metadata collection program conducted under authority of Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act.
Part III continues by discussing the three district court decisions to
consider the constitutionality of the bulk telephony metadata collection
program. Part IV then introduces the Supreme Court of the United

17. Smith v. Obama, No. 2:13-CV-257, 2014 WL 2506421, at *4 (D. Idaho June, 3
2014) (“Smith was not overruled, and it continues . . . to bind this Court.”); ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Because Smith controls, the NSA‟s bulk
telephony metadata collection program does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”); Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 37 (distinguishing Smith in light of changes in technology and
concluding that “it is significantly likely” that “people have a reasonable expectation of
privacy that is violated when the Government, without any basis whatsoever to suspect
them of any wrongdoing, collects and stores for five years their telephony metadata for
purposes of subjecting it to high-tech querying and analysis without any case-by-case judicial approval”).
18. Oral Argument, Smith v. Obama, No. 14-3555 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 2014). Oral Argument, Klayman v. Obama, No. 14-5004 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 4, 2014); Oral Argument, ACLU
v. Clapper, No. 14-42-cv (2d Cir. Sept. 2, 2014).
19. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
20. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 37.
21. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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States, decisions in United States v. Jones22 and Florida v. Jardines,23
which this Article suggests provide guidance for analyzing the bulk telephony metadata collection program under the Fourth Amendment going forward. In Part V, this Article considers the shortcomings of the
current Fourth Amendment solutions, from both courts and commentators, to the Fourth Amendment problems high-technology surveillance
presents. Part VI incorporates the teachings of Jones and Jardines into
the Court‟s general Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and sets out a
theory of qualitative limits to third-party disclosures in the digital age
for courts to apply in testing the constitutionality of programs like the
NSA‟s bulk telephony metadata collection program.
I.

THIRD-PARTY DISCLOSURES AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT

The Fourth Amendment is regarded as “indispensable to the full
enjoyment of the rights of personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”24 As a starting point for Fourth Amendment interpretation, “interference with property rights provides a surprisingly helpful
guide to the scope of Fourth Amendment protection.”25 Thus, prior to
the 1960s, the Supreme Court‟s “controlling precedent . . . held that the
fourth amendment was not applicable unless there was an actual, physical penetration into a constitutionally-protected area.”26 Accordingly,
the Court long has recognized that the Fourth Amendment‟s protections, however indispensable, are not absolute. 27 Among limitations on
Fourth Amendment protections, the United States Supreme Court consistently rejects Fourth Amendment claims “using assumption of risk
analysis.”28 The Court‟s third-party disclosure doctrine—a critical limit
on the Amendment‟s protections—is a subset of this assumption of risk

22.
23.
24.

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1895 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833).
25. Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV.
503, 516 (2007).
26. Charles E. Moylan, Jr. & John Sonsteng, Fourth Amendment Applicability, 16
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 209, 221 (1990).
27. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
Minn. L. Rev. 349, 357 (1974) (noting that “the Supreme Court and the lower courts commonly used the concept of a „constitutionally protected area‟ to define the scope of the
fourth amendment‟s protection . . . ,” but recognizing that the property-based notions of
Fourth Amendment protections did not extend to all of a person‟s property. Thus, “[t]he
constitutional protection of houses . . . was not extended to „the open fields‟”) (footnotes
omitted)).
28. THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND
INTERPRETATION § 3.5.1.1, at 83 (2008).
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analysis: “[B]y exposing . . . information . . . to a third person, one assumes the risk that the third person will disclose the information . . . to
the police . . . .”29
The Supreme Court laid the foundation for the development of the
third-party disclosure doctrine in 1967 with its decision in Katz v. United States.30 There, the Court shifted the focus of Fourth Amendment
protection from property interests to privacy interests. 31 The lasting
legacy of Katz is the two-pronged test that emerged from Justice John
Marshall Harlan II‟s concurring opinion. Justice Harlan framed the issue in Fourth Amendment cases as determining the scope of the protection “afford[ed] to th[e] people.”32 The answer to this question, said Justice Harlan, depends on a “twofold” inquiry. 33 First, courts must ask
whether the person objecting to the government activity “exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.”34 If the court finds that the
person exhibited an actual expectation of privacy, the court must then
ask whether “that . . . expectation [is] one that society is prepared to
recognize as „reasonable.‟”35
Thus, under Justice Harlan‟s test, “a person must exhibit an actual
subjective expectation of privacy and that expectation must be [objectively reasonable].”36 If the person‟s expectations fail either prong of
Harlan‟s test, Fourth Amendment protections do not apply, 37 and
“where the fourth amendment is inapplicable, the law does not give a
constitutional damn about noncompliance.”38
Although commentators thought of the pre-Katz focus on constitutionally protected places as “awkward and tend[ing] to yield inequitable
results,”39 the “property-based construction of the fourth amendment
proved to be remarkably durable,” even in the face of an ever-advancing
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
31. See, e.g., Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint For Adapting the Fourth
Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1303 (2002)
(“In the late 1960‟s, the Supreme Court engineered a paradigm shift in Fourth Amendment law: instead of focusing solely on property interests in determining whether or not a
„search‟ had occurred, the Court broadened the scope of the Amendment‟s protection to
include any activity in which an individual has „a reasonable expectation of privacy.‟”
(footnotes omitted)).
32. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. CLANCY, supra note 28, § 3.3.1, at 60.
37. Id.
38. Moylan & Sonsteng, supra note 26, at 210.
39. Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth
American Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 968, 968 (1968).
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technological world.40 Katz freed the Fourth Amendment from the
bounds of the rigid “constitutionally protected” areas inquiry, but the
decision also ushered in a new set of problems for courts in defining the
scope of their privacy analysis. While Katz “expand[ed] . . . the boundaries of fourth amendment [sic] protection[,] . . . . it offer[ed] neither a
comprehensive test of fourth amendment [sic] coverage nor any positive
principles by which questions of coverage can be resolved.” 41 “The decision seemed to banish to legal limbo much of the judiciary‟s prior experience with the fourth amendment [sic], and the highly elastic boundaries of the „reasonable expectation of privacy‟ test made judicial
construction of the amendment quite haphazard.” 42 There is agreement
that “since Katz v. United States the touchstone of [Fourth] Amendment
analysis has been the question of whether a person has a „constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.‟” 43 However, determining what constitutes a “reasonable expectation of privacy” has often
proved vexing. Indeed, both the lower courts and the Supreme Court
have struggled with “the seemingly indeterminate Katz test, and the
broad range of factors logically impinging upon it.” 44 The struggle for
courts has been not only to define when individuals can justifiably—or
reasonably—rely on privacy under Katz‟s first prong, but also to define
what types of “police investigative practice[s] . . . threaten[] that sense
of security” under Katz‟s second prong.45 At bottom, inquiries attempting to define justifiable reliance on privacy inevitably turn on the

40. Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the „Reasonable Expectation of Privacy‟: An Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1085 (1987) (footnote omitted).
41. Amsterdam, supra note 27, at 385; Wilkins, supra note 40 at 1088 (“Under Katz
the fourth amendment applies whenever government activity infringes upon a „reasonable
expectation of privacy;‟ unfortunately, however, Katz itself provides no clear indication
how the lower courts are to draw that line.”).
42. Wilkins, supra note 40, at 1088. Note, however, that in Florida v. Jardines, 133
S. Ct. 1409 (2013), and United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), the Court emphasized that Katz added to the protections of the Fourth Amendments without displacing
property rights as a measure by which to gauge Fourth Amendment protections. See
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (“By reason of our decision in Katz v. United States property
rights „are not the sole measure Fourth Amendment violations,‟—but though Katz may
add to the baseline, it does not subtract anything from the Amendment‟s protections
„when the Government does engage in [a] physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected
area.‟”) (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
43. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
44. Wilkins, supra note 40, at 1090.
45. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.1(d), at 440-45; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)
(“Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth
Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a „justifiable,‟ a „reasonable,‟ or a „legitimate expectation of privacy‟ that has been invaded by government action.” (citing cases)).
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courts‟ “determin[ation of] what kind of privacy we are entitled to expect.”46
While courts have reached inconsistent results applying Katz,47 the
1970s saw the Court “create[] an exception to Fourth Amendment protections for papers turned over to a third party.”48 Since then, courts
uniformly have held that “[i]ndividuals generally lose a reasonable expectation of privacy in their information once they reveal it to third parties.”49 This third-party disclosure exception to the Fourth Amendment‟s protection of an individual‟s reasonable expectation of privacy is
grounded in the Katz majority‟s recognition that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.”50
The development of the third-party disclosure doctrine is traceable
to United States v. Miller. There, the Court concluded that depositors
have “no legitimate „expectation of privacy‟” in bank records created
from checks and deposit slips.51 In so holding, the Court started from
the premise that no protected interests are implicated “unless there is
a[] [government] intrusion into a zone of privacy.” 52 In considering
whether the government seizure of copies of bank records “violate[d] the
privacy upon which [the depositor] justifiably relie[d],”53 the Court cited
Katz for the proposition that one cannot justifiably rely on the privacy
of “„[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public.‟” 54 Accordingly, the
Court “perceived no legitimate „expectation of privacy‟” in the contents
of the bank records that third-party banks created from information
drawn from checks deposited at the bank. 55 Under this theory, “[t]he
depositor takes the risk[] in revealing his affairs to another” and, in doing so, also loses the protection of the Fourth Amendment as to those
matters disclosed to third parties.56
Just three years later, in Smith v. Maryland, the Court reasoned
that the holding of Miller compelled the conclusion that an individual
46. STEPHEN J. SCHULOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 121 (2012).
47. Wilkins, supra note 40, at 1090, 1090 n. 56 (noting that “lower courts‟ sometimes inconsistent application of the [Katz] standard is understandable” and citing cases).
48. Alyssa H. DaCunha, Comment, Txts R Safe 4 2Day: Quon v. Arch Wireless and
the Fourth Amendment Applied to Text Messages, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 295, 296 (2009).
49. E.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 335 (6th Cir. 2001).
50. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
51. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
52. Id. at 440 (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Id. at 442 (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. Id. at 442 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (1967)) (alteration in original).
55. Id.
56. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
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“can claim no legitimate expectation of privacy” in the numbers dialed
on a home telephone and “conveyed . . . to the telephone company.” 57
The Court concluded that, given the necessary disclosure of the numbers dialed to third-party telephone companies, “telephone subscribers .
. . [do not] harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial
will remain secret.”58 Further, even if an individual “harbor[ed] some
subjective expectation that the phone numbers . . . dialed would remain
private, [that] expectation is not „one that society is prepared to recognize as „reasonable.‟”59 This is so, said the Court, because “a person has
no legitimate expectation of privacy in information . . . voluntarily
turn[ed] over to third parties.”60 In so holding, the Court rejected the defendant‟s claim that “he demonstrated an expectation of privacy by his
conduct . . . since he „us[ed] the telephone in his house to the exclusion
of all others.‟”61 The Court held that “the site of the call [was] immaterial for purposes of [Fourth Amendment] analysis.” 62 While the fact that
the call was made within the confines of the defendant‟s house may
have been material as to the contents of the telephone conversation, the
location of the call “could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the number he dialed.”63 “Regardless of his location” the defendant had to disclose the number he dialed to the third-party telephone
company, placing that information outside the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.64
II. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, STATUTORY REGULATION,
AND THE NSA‟S BULK TELEPHONY METADATA COLLECTION
PROGRAM
Miller established that people do not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in records created from information voluntary turned over to
third parties during “the normal course of business.” 65 Smith made it
“clear[] [that] one lacks an expectation of privacy in [source and destination information associated with telephone conversations], and law

57. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
58. Id. at 742-43.
59. Id. at 743 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 743).
60. Id. at 743-44 (citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-44).
61. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 6, Smith, 442 U.S.
735 (No. 78-5374)) (second alteration in original).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Matthew D. Lawless, The Third Party Doctrine Redux: Internet Search Records
and the Case for a “Crazy Quilt of Fourth Amendment Protection, 11 UCLA J.L. & TECH.,
Spring 2007, 10 (2007).
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enforcement officials need not seek a warrant to acquire it.” 66 Thus, together, Miller and Smith sanctioned broad police investigatory techniques.67 In the absence of Fourth Amendment protection, Congress has
sought to regulate such investigatory practices to balance privacy interests against the needs of law enforcement investigatory efforts outside
of the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. One prominent
example of statutory regulation of law enforcement investigation is the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”). 68 Congress enacted FISA
in 1978 in “response to intelligence abuse,” 69 “to authorize and regulate
certain governmental electronic surveillance of communications for foreign intelligence purposes” outside of the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.70
On June 5, 2013, The Guardian reported the details of a secret
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) Order authorizing the
indiscriminate collection of “the telephone records of millions of US customers of Verizon.”71 This classified Order provided:
[T]he Custodian of Records shall produce to the National Security
Agency . . . on an ongoing and regular basis . . . for the duration of the
Order . . . all call detail records or “telephony metadata” created by
Verizon for communications (i) between the United States and abroad;
or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone
calls.72

The Order defines “telephony metadata” as “includ[ing] comprehensive communications routing information, including but not limited
66. Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw‟s Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1375, 1383 (2004).
67. Lawless, supra note, 65 at 9 (under Miller and Smith, “constitutional privacy interests in information are both bright and binary. It does not matter if the information is
exposed for a limited purpose, or in confidence; it matters only whether the individual
should know the information was made available to another party”).
68. Electronic Surveillance within the United States for Foreign Intelligence Purposes Act, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§18011885c).
69. See JOHN NORTON MOORE & ROBERT F. TURNER, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 1072
(2d ed. 2005); see also 1 DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY
INVESTIGATIONS & PROSECUTIONS § 3.7, at 105 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter 1 KRIS &
WILSON] (stating that “[t]he lack of unanimity and the absence of „systematic analysis‟ in
decisions” reviewing alleged abuses of surveillance in the national security context “were
major factors in Congress‟s decision to regulate electronic surveillance for national security purposes in FISA”).
70. Clapper v. Amnesty Int‟l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013).
71. Greenwald, Verizon, supra note 2.
72. Secondary Order, In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an
Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From Verizon Bus. Network Servs.,
Inc. on Behalf of MCI Commc‟n Servs., Inc. D/B/A/ Verizon Bus. Servs., at 1-2, No. BR 1380 (FISC Apr. 25, 2013).
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to session identifying information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI), etc.),
trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration
of the call.”73 Under the Order, “[t]elephony metadata does not include
the substantive content of any communication, . . . or the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer.” 74 The FISC
issued this order pursuant to Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act.
On August 9, 2013, President Barack Obama‟s administration justified the bulk telephony metadata collection program in a white paper
“explain[ing] the Government‟s legal basis for intelligence collection under which the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) obtains court orders directing certain telecommunications service providers to produce
telephony metadata in bulk.”75
The white paper argued that in the War on Terror the United
States faces a significant challenge in “identifying terrorist operatives
and networks, particularly those operating within the United States,” 76
and explained the Government has found that analyzing “metadata associated with telephone calls within, to, or from the United States” is a
particularly useful tool for trained analysts to root out terrorism-related
communications.77 According to the paper, “[t]he telephony metadata
collection program was specifically developed” to enhance the abilities
of these analysts and has “help[ed] to close critical intelligence gaps
that were highlighted by the September 11, 2001 attacks.” 78
Under the telephony metadata collection program, the FBI works
in tandem with the NSA. Once the FBI obtains an order under Section
215 of the USA Patriot Act, the telecommunications service providers
subject to the order “produce business records that contain information
about communications between telephone numbers.”79 The NSA then
“stores and analyzes this information under carefully controlled circumstances.”80
The NSA may search the database of collected telephony metadata
only with an “„identifier,‟” referred to as a “„seed,‟” which may be a tele73.
74.
75.

Id. at 2.
Id.
U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, ADMIN. WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY
METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 1 (2013) [hereinafter ADMIN.
TELEPHONY METADATA WHITE PAPER], available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/natsec/nsa/20130816/Section%20215%20%20Obama%20Administration%20White%20Paper.pdf.
76. Id. at 2.
77. Id. at 2-3.
78. Id. at 3.
79. Id.
80. ADMIN. TELEPHONY METADATA WHITE PAPER, supra note 75, at 3.
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phone number “associated with one of the foreign terrorist organizations that was previously identified to and approved by the [FISC].” 81 In
order to use a “seed” to initiate a query of the telephony metadata database, “there must be a „reasonable, articulable suspicion‟ that [the] …
seed identifier . . . is associated with a particular foreign terrorist organization.”82 After initiation of a database query, NSA analysts obtain
certain information that is “responsive” to the query, including the telephone numbers that have been in contact with the “seed” and “the
dates, times, and duration of those calls.” 83 NSA analysts may then use
responsive telephone numbers, referred to as “hops,” to commence a
query for information responsive to those contacts. 84 This process may
continue with the analysts running queries of numbers as far down as
the “third „hop‟ from the seed telephone number.” 85 Through this process of running successive queries of the database, an order issued under the telephony metadata collection program “allows the NSA to retrieve information as many as three” steps removed from the initial
“seed” for which there was “reasonable, articulable suspicion” of an association with a terrorist group.86
This bulk collection program is subject to Congressional oversight
and is monitored by the Department of Justice, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, and the Intelligence Community. 87 Importantly,
however, there is no direct judicial regulation of the program. Prior to
initiating a query of the database, one of “twenty-two designated NSA
officials” must make a finding that there is “reasonable, articulable
suspicion” that the proposed “seed” is indeed “associated with a specific
foreign terrorist organization.”88 Further, if a proposed “seed” is believed to belong to a United States citizen, the NSA‟s Office of General
Counsel must approve any findings of “reasonable, articulable suspicion.”89 Of importance here, though, obtaining authorization to query
the database does not require court approval.90
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 4.
85. “The second „hop‟ refers to the set of numbers found to be in direct contact with
the first „hop‟ numbers, and the third „hop‟ refers to the numbers found to be in direct contact with the second „hop‟ numbers.” ADMIN. TELEPHONY METADATA WHITE PAPER, supra
note 75, at 3-4.
86. Id. at 4.
87. Id. at 4-5.
88. Id. at 5.
89. Id.
90. ADMIN. TELEPHONY METADATA WHITE PAPER, supra note 75, 5 (“No more than
twenty-two designated NSA officials can make a finding that there is „reasonable, articu-
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The Government maintains that the bulk telephony metadata collection program comports with the statutory requirements of Section
215 of the USA Patriot Act and that the program is consistent with the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 91 For purposes of
this article, discussion of the legal justifications for the bulk telephony
metadata collection program is limited to the administration‟s constitutional justifications.
The Government first contends that the orders for production of telephony metadata do not, in themselves, constitute a “search” within
the meaning of the Constitution, because, under Smith, “participants in
telephone calls lack any reasonable expectation of privacy . . . in the telephone numbers dialed.”92 Further, the Government contends that individuals similarly have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information regarding “the length and time of the calls . . . routing,
addressing, or signaling information,” because under Smith “there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in such information, which is routinely collected by telecommunications services providers for billing and
fraud detection purposes.”93
Even assuming arguendo that the bulk telephony metadata collection program constituted a Fourth Amendment “search,” the Government argues that the program still would not offend the Fourth
Amendment because the “search would satisfy the reasonableness
standard that the Supreme Court has established in its cases authorizing the Government to conduct large-scale, but minimally intrusive,
suspicionless searches.”94 According to Supreme Court precedent, such
a reasonableness inquiry balances the intrusion upon an individual‟s
privacy that the “search” occasions against the public interest that the
“search” advances. Here, the Government argues that the minimally invasive collection of telephony metadata is substantially outweighed by
the “public interest in the prevention of terrorist attacks.” 95 The Government‟s reasonableness justifications, however, fall beyond the pale of
this Article‟s Fourth Amendment discussion.

lable suspicion‟ that a seed identifier proposed for query is associated with a specific foreign terrorist organization, and NSA‟s Office of General Counsel must review and approve
any such findings for numbers believed to be used by U.S. persons.”).
91. Id. at 5, 19.
92. Id. at 19.
93. Id. at 20.
94. Id. at 21.
95. ADMIN. TELEPHONY METADATA WHITE PAPER, supra note 75, at 21.
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III. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS SPLIT ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BULK TELEPHONY METADATA
COLLECTION
Following closely on the heels of the Edward Snowden leaks, United States District Courts began fielding complaints challenging the constitutionality and statutory authorization of the NSA‟s bulk telephony
metadata collection program.96 On the issue of the program‟s constitutionality, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
and the United States District Court for the District of Idaho have
reached conflicting conclusions in Klayman v. Obama,97 ACLU v. Clapper,98 and Smith v. Obama,99 respectively.
A. THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA DISTRICT FINDS BULK TELEPHONY METADATA COLLECTION
“LIKELY” UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN KLAYMAN V. OBAMA
The day after The Guardian reported on the Edward Snowden
leaks, plaintiff telecommunication and internet service subscribers filed
suit “challenging the constitutionality and statutory authorization” of
the bulk telephony metadata collection program.100 In considering
plaintiffs‟ motion for a preliminary injunction during the pendency of
the suit, United States District Judge Richard J. Leon concluded that
plaintiffs “demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their Fourth Amendment claim, and that they will suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary injunctive relief,” thus entitling them to
a preliminary injunction of the bulk telephony metadata collection program.101
Judge Leon framed the Fourth Amendment challenge as one alleg-

96. E.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13CIV-3994, 2013 WL 6819708 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013) (No. 13-CIV-3994); Complaint,
Klayman v. Obama, 2013 WL 6598728 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013) (No. 1:13-CV-00881 ); Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition, or a Writ of Certiorari, In re Electronic Privacy Information Center, No. 13-50 (S. Ct. June 8, 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 638
(2013) (mem.); Complaint for Constitutional and Statutory Violations, Seeking Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. NSA, No. CV 13 3287
(N.D. Cal. July 16, 2013); Complaint, Smith v. Obama, No. 2:13-cv-00257 (D. Idaho June
12, 2013).
97. Klayman, No. 1:13-CV-00881, 2013 WL 6598728.
98. Clapper, No. 13-CIV-3994, 2013 WL 6819708.
99. Smith, No. 2:13-cv-00257, 2014 WL 2506421.
100. Klayman, No. 1:13-CV-00881, 2013 WL 6598728, at *1.
101. Id. at *2.
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ing a violation of subjective and reasonable expectations of privacy. 102
Framed in this way, the issue presented was in the familiar form of determining whether plaintiffs held a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their telephony metadata that the Government violates by collecting it
“along with the metadata of hundreds of millions of other citizens without any particularized suspicion of wrongdoing, retains all of that
metadata for five years, and then queries, analyzes, and investigates
that data without prior judicial approval of the investigative targets.” 103
In addressing this issue, Judge Leon distinguished the bulk telephony
metadata collection program from the pen register at issue in Smith.104
Instead, Judge Leon stated that evolution, both in Government surveillance technology and in “citizens‟ phone habits,” have “become so thoroughly unlike those considered by the Supreme Court thirty-four years
ago that a precedent like Smith simply does not apply.”105
In support of this position, Judge Leon first noted that the scope of
data collected under the bulk telephony metadata collection program is
vastly different than the collection at issue in Smith. Indeed, the pen
registers in use in Smith had limited recording capabilities and limited
scope. Thus, the Supreme Court in Smith considered only “forwardlooking” data collected over a short time period.106 However, the bulk
telephony metadata collection program “involves the creation and
maintenance of a historical database containing five years‟ worth of data.”107 Not only is the scope of data collected different, but the time period over which the data is collected has changed. While the “pen register
in Smith was operational for only a matter of days,” the exigency that
spawned the bulk telephony collection program—the War on Terror—
could very well last for years, if not decades, and “there is the very real
prospect that the program will go on for as long as America is combatting terrorism.”108 Indeed, Judge Leon noted, the program could foreseeably go on forever.109
Judge Leon then went on to explain that not only had the technology in use changed from Smith, but also that the relationship between
the Government and the phone companies under the bulk telephony
metadata collection program is vastly different from “the relationship
between the police and the phone company in Smith.”110 Namely, Judge
102. Id. at *17 (“This case obviously does not involve a physical intrusion, and plaintiffs do not claim otherwise.”).
103. Id.
104. Id. at *18.
105. Id.
106. Klayman, 2013 WL 6598728, at *19.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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Leon focused on the fact that in Smith third-party telephone companies
were merely collecting information for police whereas under the bulk
telephony metadata collection program third-party telephone companies
have been turning over call detail information daily since May 2006. 111
This difference between the programs was crucial because there is “a
meaningful difference between cases in which a third party collects information and then turns it over to law enforcement and cases in which
the government and the third party create a formalized policy under
which the service provider collects information for law enforcement
purposes.”112 Thus, the telephony metadata collection scheme under
which service providers indiscriminately collect a vast database of information for law enforcement purposes is meaningfully different than
the “one-time, targeted request for data regarding an individual suspect
in a criminal investigation” at issue in Smith.113
Judge Leon also found that the technology at issue in bulk telephony metadata collection is vastly different than the technology at issue
in Smith. In Smith, the Court considered pen registers that were, at the
time, able to “collect one person‟s phone records for calls made after the
pen register was installed and for the limited purpose of a small-scale
investigation.”114 By contrast, the technology at the Government‟s disposal today—and in use in the bulk telephony metadata collection program—allows the Government to “collect similar data on hundreds of
millions of people and retain that data for a five-year period, updating it
with new data every day in perpetuity.” 115 Such technology “was at best,
in 1979, the stuff of science fiction.”116
Finally, Judge Leon found that the sheer difference in the quality
of telephony metadata today distinguished the bulk telephony metadata
collection program from the pen register at issue in Smith.117 Not only
do almost all United States citizens use mobile connections, the phones
they use “have also morphed into multi-purpose devices.”118 Additionally, cell phones follow their users everywhere—where mobile phones are
today, there would be no phones when the Court decided Smith. Thus,
while “the types of information at issue . . . are relatively limited,” like
111. Id.
112. Klayman, 2013 WL 6598728, at *19 (citation omitted) (citing Ferguson v.
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001)).
113. Id.
114. Id. at *20 (emphasis added).
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Id.
117. Id. at *19 (“I am convinced that the surveillance program now before me is so
different from a simple pen register that Smith is of little value in assessing whether the
Bulk Telephony Metadata Program constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.”).
118. Klayman, 2013 WL 6598728, at *20.
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in Smith, “the ubiquity of phones has dramatically altered the quantity
of information that is now available and, more importantly, what that
information can tell the Government about people‟s lives.” 119 Judge Leon went on to note that the ubiquity of mobile phone use has also
changed people‟s relationship with their phones: “This rapid and monumental shift towards a cell phone-centric culture means that the
metadata from each person‟s phone „reflects a wealth of detail about her
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,‟ that
could not have been gleaned from a data collection in 1979.” 120 Whereas
in 1979 the use of a pen register might have revealed a piecemeal picture of a person‟s life, collection of metadata today “reveal[s] an entire
mosaic—a vibrant and constantly updating picture of the person‟s
life.”121 Judge Leon found that “these cultural changes . . . have resulted
in a greater expectation of privacy and a recognition that society views
that expectation as reasonable.”122
Accordingly, because of the significant changes in technology since
Smith, Judge Leon found that the collection of telephony metadata likely constituted a Fourth Amendment “search” notwithstanding the fact
that plaintiffs disclosed the collected information to a third party. 123
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
heard oral argument on the United States‟ appeal from Judge Leon‟s
order on November 4, 2014.124
B. THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT
OF NEW YORK UPHOLDS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BULK TELEPHONY
METADATA COLLECTION IN ACLU V. CLAPPER
Unlike Judge Leon‟s extensive Fourth Amendment analysis in
Klayman, United States District Judge William H. Pauley III gave the
Fourth Amendment challenge to the NSA‟s bulk telephony metadata
collection program relatively short shrift in dismissing plaintiffs‟ complaint in ACLU v. Clapper. Relying on Smith, Judge Pauley started
from the position that “individual[s] ha[ve] no legitimate expectation of
privacy in information provided to third parties.”125 In rejecting plaintiffs‟ invitation to distinguish Smith on the basis of the quantity and
quality of information disclosed under the bulk telephony metadata col119. Id.
120. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
121. Id. at *19.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Oral Argument, Klayman v. Obama, No. 14-5004 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 4, 2014).
125. ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13-CIV-3994, 2013 WL 6819708, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27,
2013).
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lection program, Judge Pauley first noted that the NSA can only query
that information with “legal justification—subject to rigorous minimization procedures” and that, once queried, the information produced is
limited and does not identify the owners of telephone numbers. 126 He
then went on to state that “[t]he collection of breathtaking amounts of
information unprotected by the Fourth Amendment does not transform
that sweep into a Fourth Amendment search.” 127 Responding directly to
Judge Leon‟s contention that the drastic change in people‟s relationship
with their phones warranted distinguishing Smith, Judge Pauley “observe[d] that their relationship with their telecommunications providers
has not changed.”128 Unlike Judge Leon, Judge Pauley was not persuaded that the versatility of mobile phones distinguished Smith. Indeed, bulk telephony metadata collection implicates only the cellphone‟s
“use as telephones” and “[t]he fact that there are more calls placed does
not undermine the Supreme Court‟s finding that a person has no subjective expectation of privacy in [their] telephony metadata.” 129
Thus, at bottom, Judge Pauley saw no distinction between bulk telephony metadata collection and the use of a pen register at issue in
Smith.130 Accordingly, Smith controlled Judge Pauley‟s reasoning and
he found that “the NSA‟s bulk telephony metadata collection program
does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” 131 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit heard oral argument in the appeal from
Judge Pauley‟s order on September 2, 2014. 132
C. THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
RELUCTANTLY UPHOLDS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BULK TELEPHONY
METADATA COLLECTION IN SMITH V. OBAMA
Apparently taking a middle road between Judge Pauley and Judge
Leon, United States District Court Chief Judge B. Lynn Winmill upheld
the NSA‟s bulk telephony metadata collection program in the face of a

126. Id. at *21.
127. Id. at *22.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Id. at *22 (“Importantly, „what metadata is has not changed over time,‟ and
„[a]s in Smith, the types of information at issue in this case are relatively limited:
[tele]phone numbers dialed, date, time, and the like.‟”) (alteration in original) (quoting
Klayman v. Obama, No. 1:13-CV-0881, 2013 WL 6598728, at *21) (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013)).
131. Clapper, 2013 WL 6819708, at *22 (“Because Smith controls, the NSA‟s bulk telephony metadata collection program does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”).
132. Oral Argument, ACLU v. Clapper, No. 14-42-cv (2d Cir. Sept. 2, 2014).
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constitutional challenge, but did so reluctantly. 133 Though noting, as
Judge Pauley did, that “Smith was not overruled” and, accordingly, controlled the outcome of plaintiff‟s challenge to the NSA program, 134
Judge Winmill gave credence to plaintiff‟s Fourth Amendment challenge to the bulk telephony metadata collection program. Citing Judge
Leon‟s opinion approvingly, Judge Winmill opined that the reasoning
there “should serve as a template for a Supreme Court opinion” and
predicted that “it might yet.”135 Thus, unlike Judge Pauley‟s outright
rejection of a Fourth Amendment challenge to the NSA‟s bulk telephony
metadata collection program, Judge Winmill agreed with Judge Leon‟s
reasoning, but nonetheless concluded he was bound by Smith. On December 8, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard oral argument on Smith‟s appeal from Judge Winmill‟s order.136
IV. RECENT SUPREME COURT CASES SHOW THE WRITING ON
THE WALL FOR NSA BULK METADATA COLLECTION
In recent Supreme Court decisions, the Court has struggled both
with application of Katz‟s reasonable expectation of privacy test in light
of the significant advances in technology since Smith and in light of the
cultural shift toward ever-increasing reliance on technology for daily
tasks. The Court also has indicated potential limits to its assumptionof-risk analysis, with which the third-party-disclosure doctrine is tied
up. This Part will examine those decisions and their implications for
the future of the third-party disclosure doctrine.
A. UNITED STATES V. JONES137 CONCURRING OPINIONS INDICATE A
POTENTIAL SHIFT IN THE COURT‟S THIRD-PARTY DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE
Both Judge Leon and the plaintiffs in Clapper relied heavily on
Justice Sonya Sotomayor‟s concurrence in United States v. Jones.138 In
that case, the Supreme Court held “that the Government‟s installation
of a GPS device on a target‟s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle‟s movements, constitute[d] a „search.‟”139 Writing for the
133. See Smith v. Obama, No. 2:13-CV-257, 2014 WL 2506421, at *3-4 (D. Idaho
June 3, 2014).
134. Id. at *4.
135. Id. at *3.
136. Oral Argument, Smith v. Obama, No. 14-3555 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 2014).
137. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
138. Klayman, v. Obama, No. 1:13-CV-0881, 2013 WL 6598728, at *17-18, *20-21
(D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013); Pl.‟s Mem. of Law in Opp‟n to Defs.‟s Mot. to Dismiss at 27-29,
ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13-CIV-3994, 2013 WL 6819708 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013).
139. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (footnote omitted).
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Court, Justice Antonin Scalia, harkening back to Olmstead v. United
States,140 focused on government trespass upon private property to find
that the government action at issue constituted a “search,” rather than
focusing on any inquiry into the defendant‟s expectations of privacy. 141
Indeed, Justice Scalia opined that deciding the case at hand based on a
Katz expectation of privacy analysis would “needlessly lead[] [the Court]
into „particularly vexing problems.”142 However, five Justices did analyze the Government‟s GPS surveillance under the Katz rubric and indicated that the Court might be ready to reexamine its third-party disclosure doctrine.143
Notably, Justice Sotomayor‟s concurrence expressly raised the
specter that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”144 In doing so, Justice Sotomayor
opined that the third-party disclosure doctrine was no longer a good fit
for the advancing “digital age.”145 Today, she explained, “people reveal a
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course
of carrying out mundane tasks.”146 In light of the necessities of such disclosures in the digital age, Justice Sotomayor “would not assume that
all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a
limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”147
Justice Alito, writing for Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan,
went even further than Justice Sotomayor and applied a full-blown
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy analysis to the GPS monitoring

140. Olmstead was the Court‟s leading precedent on the trespass-based inquiry to
the Fourth Amendment before Katz. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
141. Jones, 132 S. Ct.at 950 (rejecting the Government‟s argument that “no search
occurred . . . since Jones had no „reasonable expectation of privacy‟ in the area of the Jeep
accessed by Government agents . . . and in the locations of the Jeep on the public roads,
which were visible to all . . . , because Jones‟s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall
with the Katz formulation. At bottom, we must „assur[e] preservation of that degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. . . .
[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular
concern for government trespass upon the areas . . . it enumerates.” (fourth alteration in
original) (emphasis added) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001))).
142. Id. at 953 .
143. Id. at 954-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring) (“I
would analyze the question presented in this case by asking whether respondent‟s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.”).
144. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
145. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
146. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
147. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (emphasis added) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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at issue.148 In doing so, Justice Alito noted that “relatively short-term
monitoring of a person‟s movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable.” 149
However, where short-term monitoring lapses into “secretly monitor[ing] and catologu[ing] every single movement of an individual‟s car
for a very long period of time” the Government surveillance “impinges
on expectations of privacy” and, thus, implicates the Fourth Amendment.150 While not establishing the line at which point Government
surveillance triggers Fourth Amendment protections, Justice Alito
wrote that tracking Jones‟s vehicle continuously for four weeks clearly
crossed that line.151 Justice Alito reasoned that advancing technology
was changing society‟s expectations of privacy and “[d]ramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in
flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes.”152
Surely, some people may readily accept the convenience that advancing technology provides and view decreased privacy as an “expense” in a sort of “tradeoff” for the benefits of technology.153 Justice
Alito explained, it may be that as this intrusion on privacy increases,
“concern about new intrusions on privacy may spur the enactment of
legislation to protect against these intrusions.” 154 However, in the absence of such legislation, it is for the courts “to apply existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine” to the facts presented in cases involving use of
advanced technology to conduct “searches.” 155
B. FLORIDA V. JARDINES TURNS ON A LIMITED LICENSE THEORY
In Florida v. Jardines,156 the Court found that a dog sniff conducted
on the defendant‟s front porch constituted a Fourth Amendment
“search.”157 The majority, per Justice Scalia, did so without considering
whether the dog sniff outside of the defendant‟s home infringed on his
reasonable expectation of privacy.158 Instead, the Court framed the is-

148. See Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring) (“I would analyze the question presented in
this case by asking whether respondent‟s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated
by the long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.”).
149. Id. at 964. (Alito, J., concurring).
150. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
151. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring).
153. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring).
154. Id.(Alito, J., concurring).
155. Id.(Alito, J., concurring).
156. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
157. Id. at 1417-18.
158. Id. at 1417.
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sue as whether, by bringing a trained narcotics dog on to defendant‟s
property, the Government impermissibly physically intruded into the
curtilage of his home.159 In analyzing the question thus framed, the
Court recognized the “implicit license [that] typically permits the visitor
to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to
be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.” 160 Accordingly, “a police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a
home and knock, precisely because that is „no more than any private citizen might do.‟”161 However, the Court went on to explain, bringing a
trained police dog along “in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence
is something” beyond what the implied license permits. 162 Thus, because “the background social norms that invite a visitor to the front
door do not invite him there to conduct a search,” the officers violated
the scope of the implied license and were thus trespassing on defendant‟s property163—customary licenses in favor of the public at large do
not permit police officers leave to conduct a law enforcement investigation. Indeed, “[t]he scope of a license—express or implied—is limited not
only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose.”164 As such, the
case was “a straightforward one” for the Court in that the officers
“gathered . . . information by physically entering and occupying the area” without explicit or implicit leave from the homeowner in violation of
core Fourth Amendment tenets.165
While agreeing with the property analysis of the majority, Justice
Elena Kagan, writing for Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, “wr[o]te
separately to note that [she] could just as happily decided it by looking
to Jardines‟ privacy interests.”166 In doing so, Justice Kagan indicated a
possible continued change in thinking regarding expectations of privacy. Justice Kagan suggested, as did the majority, that allowing the Government to thwart Fourth Amendment protections by taking advantage
of limited licenses would frustrate the “practical value” of Fourth
Amendment rights.167
159. Id. at 1416-17.
160. Id. at 1415.
161. Id. at 1416 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011)).
162. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 (quoting King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862).
163. Id.
164. Id. (emphasis added).
165. Id. at 1414.
166. Id. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring) (insisting on the maintenance of one‟s right
“to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion . . . by preventing police officers from standing in an adjacent space and trawl[ing] for
evidence with impunity.” (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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V. HOW JONES AND JARDINES GUIDE ANALYSIS OF THE NSA
BULK TELEPHONY COLLECTION PROGRAM
Since Jones, there has been wide discussion among commentators
about the case‟s potential effect on high technology surveillance and the
Fourth Amendment.168 While much of the commentary has focused on
the significance of Justice Scalia‟s purported return to “a trespass-first
rule,”169 other commentary has discussed the privacy-based Fourth
Amendment implications of “five justices, in two separate concurring
opinions [in Jones], . . . suggest[ing] that an important constitutional
line is crossed—and the constraints of the Fourth Amendment are triggered—when public surveillance becomes too intense or prolonged.”170
For instance, Justice Alito‟s concurrence has been lauded as “a new
Katz test” under which “police conduct is a search when it „involve[s] a
degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated‟ in that „particular case.‟”171
As discussed above,172 when faced with the issue of the constitutionality of the NSA‟s bulk metadata collection program in the postJones world, three United States District Courts have disagreed as to
168. See generally, e.g., Kevin Emas & Tamara Pallas, United States v. Jones: Does
Katz Still Have Nine Lives?, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 116, 117 (2012) (“[E]xplor[ing] the
Court‟s recent retreat from the two-part Katz test, and [the] unexpected shift in the considerations the Court declared it will primarily rely upon when evaluating whether a
Fourth Amendment search occurred.”); see also Erica Goldberg, How United States v.
Jones Can Restore Our Faith in the Fourth Amendment, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 62, 62 (2011) (“Jones should restore our faith in the Fourth Amendment not
necessarily because it is more protective of Fourth Amendment rights, but because it
gives the Justices a more concrete framework to determine whether the government has
executed a search. Because Jones has supplemented the reasonableness inquiry with a
physical trespass test, the determination of whether government action constitutes a
search can be based on objective factors. Over time, this should make the results of
Fourth Amendment cases more predictable and defensible and perhaps reduce much of
the cynicism surrounding Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”).
169. E.g., Arnold H. Loewy, United States v. Jones, Return to Trespass—Good News
or Bad, 82 MISS. L.J. 879, 884 (2013) (arguing that under Jones “first we look to see if
there was a trespass to a person, paper, house, or effect. If the answer is, „Yes,‟ and the
trespass was for the purpose of finding evidence, then there is a search, and we do not go
to the Katz analysis” and stating that “[w]hile the trespass in Jones may seem trivial, relative to the harm done to privacy by monitoring, there nevertheless was a trespass[]
[a]nd, at least now, it is clear that once there is a trespass, the amorphous privacy question does not even have to be reached”).
170. Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth Amendment Future of Public Surveillance:
Remote Recording and Other Searches in Public Space, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 21, 26 (2013)
(footnote omitted).
171. Jonathan Siegel & Kate Hadley, Jones‟s Second Majority Opinion: Justice Alito‟s
Concurrence and The New Katz Test, 31 YALE L. & POL‟Y REV. INTER ALIA 1, 2 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 935, 964 (Alito, J., concurring)).
172. See supra Part III.
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what, if any, effect Jones has had on the third-party disclosure doctrine
in a high-tech world. On the one hand, Judge Leon relied heavily on
Justice Sotomayor‟s concurrence in Jones to distinguish the NSA‟s collection program from Smith in Klayman.173 On the other hand, Judges
Pauley and Winmill flatly rejected the conclusion that Jones controlled,
with Judge Pauley explaining that plaintiff‟s “reliance on the concurring opinions in Jones [is] misplaced,” because “the Supreme Court did
not overrule Smith” in Jones and “[i]nferior courts are bound by that
precedent.”174
This Article does not disagree with Judge Pauley‟s and Judge
Winmill‟s conclusion that Jones did not overrule Smith and his contention that Smith remains very much good law. However, this Article
agrees with Judge Leon‟s view that the facts of Smith are distinguishable from those at issue in the NSA bulk telephony metadata collection
cases and argues that today‟s technology warrants a different view of
Smith and the third-party disclosure doctrine. However, as this Part
demonstrates, the analysis of third-party disclosures that is most faithful to the Court‟s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is different than
that employed by Judge Leon. Whereas Judge Leon focused on what
has been called “quantitative privacy” in order to distinguish Smith,175
this Article argues that expectations of privacy are better informed by
asking what limits to a disclosure an individual expects ex ante when,
say, dialing a phone number.
To that end, Section A below discusses the right of quantitative
privacy and Judge Leon‟s application of the theory of quantitative privacy. Section B then discusses the key doctrinal challenges to implementing a doctrine based solely on quantitative privacy and why such a
theory does not fit within the Court‟s current third-party disclosure doctrine.
A. THE “MOSAIC THEORY” OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND JUDGE
LEON‟S APPLICATION OF A TECHNOLOGY-FOCUSED RIGHT TO
QUANTITATIVE PRIVACY
In Klayman,176 Judge Leon focused extensively on the scope of the
NSA‟s bulk telephony metadata collection in distinguishing Smith and
173. See supra Part III.A.
174. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Smith v. Jones, No.
2:13-CV-257, 2014 WL 2506421, at *4 (D. Idaho June 3, 2014).
175. For an in depth discussion of “quantitative privacy,” see David Gray & Danielle
Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013) [hereinafter Gray &
Citron, Quantitative Privacy].
176. For an in-depth discussion, see supra Part III.A.
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concluding that “it is significantly likely that” the NSA‟s program violates phone users‟ reasonable expectations of privacy. 177 Judge Leon
signaled his reliance, though not expressly, on the idea of a right to
quantitative privacy by relying on Justice Alito and Justice Sotomayor‟s
concurring opinions in Jones for the proposition that while “short-range,
short-term” surveillance is consistent with the Fourth Amendment, the
longer in duration and broader in scope that surveillance becomes the
more it impinges on reasonable expectations of privacy. 178 Thus, on the
specific facts presented by the NSA bulk telephony metadata collection
program, Judge Leon held that the breadth of the collection along with
the duration for which the NSA stored the collected data warranted a
finding that the plaintiffs‟ Fourth Amendment claim was likely to succeed on the merits.179
In this sense, Judge Leon‟s opinion tracks closely with how the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia treated the
GPS monitoring at issue in Jones in its opinion in United States v.
Maynard.180 Professor Orin S. Kerr has termed this approach to a quantitative privacy the “„mosaic theory‟ of the Fourth Amendment.” 181 “Under the mosaic theory, searches can be analyzed as a collective sequence
of steps rather than as individual steps.” 182 Thus, while individual police actions taken during the course of an investigation may not implicate the Fourth Amendment, “the mosaic can count as a collective
Fourth Amendment search” when viewed in its entirety. 183 According to
Judge Leon, although turning over telephony metadata in isolation implicates no Fourth Amendment concerns, the cumulative effect of the
NSA collection program infringed on reasonable expectations of privacy.184
In this way, the “mosaic theory” serves as a sort of a Fourth
Amendment stopgap response to technology that is out—pacing the
Court‟s current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Professor Kerr
points to such stopgaps, like the “mosaic theory,” as evidence of “the
principle
of
equilibrium-adjustment.”185
According
to
Kerr,
177. Klayman v. Obama, No. 1:13-CV-0881, 2013 WL 6598728, at *22 (D.D.C. Dec.
16, 2013).
178. Id. at *18.
179. Id. at *22.
180. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562-65 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff‟d sub nom.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
181. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV.
311, 313, 313 n.5 (2012) [hereinafter Kerr, Mosaic].
182. Id. at 313.
183. Id.
184. See Klayman v. Obama, No. 1:13-CV-0881, 2013 WL 6598728 at *22 (D.D.C.
Dec. 16, 2013).
185. See Kerr, Mosaic, supra note 181, at 345.
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“[e]quilibrium-adjustment is a judicial response to technology and social
practice. When new tools and new practices threaten to expand or contract police power in a significant way courts adjust the level of Fourth
Amendment protection to try to restore the prior equilibrium [between
the State and the citizen].”186 Thus, in an age where technology enables
the government to quickly gather information, aggregate that information, and store it indefinitely in order to analyze later, “[t]he mosaic
theory attempts to restore the balance of power by disabling the government‟s ability to rely on what computerization enables.” 187
However noble the end of the “mosaic theory” is, though, critics of
the approach have called the means used in pursuit of that end simply
too revolutionary to take hold as the Court‟s polestar in addressing
Fourth Amendment questions. Namely, say the critics, “adopting a mosaic approach to the Fourth Amendment may require abandoning or
dramatically altering two important lines of Fourth Amendment law:
the public observation doctrine and the third party doctrine.” 188 In addition to doctrinal concerns, critics also outline “serious practical concerns
that . . . should urge us to caution before adopting the mosaic theory of
Fourth Amendment privacy.”189 For instance, Professor Kerr argues
that the mosaic theory provides little guidance “explain[ing] how conduct should be grouped to assess whether the collective whole crosses
the mosaic line,” leaving courts to arbitrarily draw lines.190
In light of the critiques of the mosaic theory from scholars and
judges alike,191 defenders of the idea of a right to quantitative privacy
and of further adapting Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to today‟s
technological age “argue . . . that Fourth Amendment interests in quan186. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REV. 476, 480 (2011).
187. Kerr, Mosaic, supra note 181, at 345.
188. E.g., David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J. L. &
TECH. 381, 402 (2013).
189. Id. at 409.
190. See Kerr, Mosaic, supra note 181, at 329.
191. Justice Scalia expressed his skepticism of the mosaic approach to the Fourth
Amendment in his opinion for the Court in United States v. Jones. There, Justice Scalia
responded to the concurring Justices‟ reliance on quantitative privacy. United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953-54 (2012). In doing so, Justice Scalia argued “the concurrence‟s
insistence on the exclusivity of the Katz test . . . needlessly leads us into „particularly vexing problems.‟” Id. at 953. “The concurrence posits that „relatively short-term monitoring
of a person‟s movements on public streets‟ is okay, but that „the use of longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses‟ is no good.” Id. at 954. Indeed, as Justice
Scalia‟s argument goes, the concurrence fails to explain “why a 4-week investigation is
„surely‟ too long.” Id. In closing, Justice Scalia challenges this line drawing, asking “What
of a 2-day monitoring . . . ? Or of a 6-month monitoring . . . ?” Id.
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titative privacy demand that we focus on how information is gathered . .
. [r]ather than asking how much information is gathered in a particular
case.”192 As such, those defenders of Fourth Amendment protection for
quantitative rights of privacy seek to provide guidance for court line
drawing. Accordingly, Professors David Gray and Danielle Citron persuasively argue:
[T]he threshold Fourth Amendment question should be whether the
technology has the capacity to facilitate broad and indiscriminate surveillance that intrudes upon reasonable expectations of quantitative
privacy by raising the specter of a surveillance state if deployment
and use of that technology is left to the unfettered discretion of law
enforcement officers or other government agents.193

In so arguing, Gray and Citron posit that “[t]he concerns about
broad programs of indiscriminate search that drove us to adopt the
Fourth Amendment in 1791 are raised anew with law enforcement‟s unfettered access to contemporary surveillance technologies.” 194 Thus, the
test they set forth focuses on the “investigative technique or technology”
used rather than engaging “on a case-by-case . . . assess[ment of] the
quality and quantity of information about a suspect gathered in the
course of a specific investigation,” as required under the mosaic theory.195 Thus, when a citizen challenges a government investigatory technique under Gray and Citron‟s test, a “court would need to consider . . . :
(1) the inherent scope of a technology‟s surveillance capabilities, be they
narrow or broad; (2) the technology‟s scale and scalability; and (3) the
costs associated with deploying and using the technology.” 196 If, after
considering these factors,
a court finds that a challenged technology is capable of broad and indiscriminate surveillance by its nature, or is sufficiently inexpensive
and scalable so as to present no practical barrier against its broad and
indiscriminate use, then granting law enforcement unfettered access
to that technology would violate reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy.197

With Gray and Citron‟s test in mind, one can read Judge Leon‟s
opinion in Klayman v. Obama not only as relying on notions of quantitative rights of privacy, but also as an application of a technologyfocused right to quantitative privacy. Similar to Gray and Citron, Judge
Leon framed the Fourth Amendment issue as:
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 175, at 71 (emphasis added).
Id. at 71-72.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 102.
Id.

218

J. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY LAW

[Vol. XXXI

whether plaintiffs have a reasonable expectation of privacy that is violated when the Government indiscriminately collects their telephony
metadata . . . without any particularized suspicion of wrongdoing, retains all of that data for five years, and then queries, analyzes, and
investigates that data without prior judicial approval of the investigative targets.198

In distinguishing Maryland v. Smith, Judge Leon concluded that
“[t]he question before [him was] not the same question that the Supreme Court confronted in Smith.”199 Indeed, said Judge Leon, “the circumstances addressed in [Smith are] a far cry from the issue in [Klayman].”200 Instead, like Gray and Citron advocate, Judge Leon asked,
among other things, when do “the evolutions in the Government‟s surveillance capabilities . . . become so thorough unlike those considered by
the Supreme Court thirty-four years ago that a precedent like Smith
simply does not apply?”201 Significantly to Judge Leon in distinguishing
Smith, “the almost-Orwellian technology that enables the Government
to store and analyze the phone metadata of every telephone user in the
United States is unlike anything that could have been conceived in
1979.”202 Further, “and most importantly, not only is the Government‟s
ability to collect, store, and analyze phone data greater now . . . , but the
nature and quantity of the information contained in people‟s telephony
metadata is much greater, as well.”203 Thus, tracking closely with the
analysis Gray and Citron offer, Judge Leon found that “the Smith pen
register and the ongoing NSA Bulk Telephony Metadata Program have
so many distinctions between them that [he] c[ould not] possibly navigate these uncharted Fourth Amendment waters using as [his] North
Star a case that predates the rise of cell phones.” 204 Rather, when the
time comes to decide the Fourth Amendment issue on the merits, Judge
Leon found that scope and scale of the surveillance of the NSA bulk telephony metadata collection program made it “significantly likely” that
he would find a violation of the plaintiffs‟ reasonable expectation of privacy.205
B. DOCTRINAL SHORTCOMINGS OF A TECHNOLOGY-FOCUSED RIGHT TO
198. Klayman v. Obama, No. 1:13-CV-0881, 2013 WL 6598728, at *17 (D.D.C. Dec.
16, 2013).
199. Id. at *18.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at *20.
203. Id.
204. Klayman, 2013 WL 6598728, at *22.
205. See Id.
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QUANTITATIVE PRIVACY
In ACLU v. Clapper, Judge Pauley expressly rejected the ACLU‟s
claim based on notions of quantitative rights to privacy.206 Judge Pauley
stated that “[t]he collection of breathtaking amounts of information unprotected by the Fourth Amendment does not transform that sweep into
a Fourth Amendment search.”207 Accordingly, finding advancement of a
claim predicated on a purported right to quantitative privacy a Fourth
Amendment a bridge too far, Judge Pauley concluded that Smith controlled and “[i]nferior courts are bound by that precedent.”208
Thus, Judge Pauley‟s opinion evinces a clear shortcoming of Professors Gray and Citron‟s technology-focused right to quantitative privacy—specifically, the idea that a technology implicates the Fourth
Amendment if the “challenged technology is capable of broad and indiscriminate surveillance by its nature, or is sufficiently inexpensive and
scalable so as to present no practical barrier against its broad and indiscriminate use.”209
Gray and Citron principally rely on United States v. Knotts210 and
Kyllo v. United States211 to support the proposition that “courts have . . .
appl[ied] the Fourth Amendment‟s reasonableness standards” to limit
the use of “emerging technologies capable of amassing large quantities
of information . . . [that] raise[] the specter of a surveillance state.” 212
Specifically, Gray and Citron argue that United States v. Knotts “indicated that „dragnet type law enforcement practices‟ might threaten
broadly held privacy expectations.”213 Additionally, they observe that
“[t]he technological capacity to effect pervasive surveillance was . . . at
issue in United States v. Kyllo” and contend that “Justice Scalia emphasized that the court must not „permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment,‟ including existing technologies and „more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in
development.‟”214
This view of Kyllo and Knotts, however, simply reads too much into
those decisions. For instance, at issue in Knotts was the use of “[a]
beeper . . . which emit[tted] periodic signals that c[ould] be picked up by
a radio receiver” to track the defendant from “Minneapolis, Minnesota

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

See ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Id. at 752.
See Id.
Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 175, at 101.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 175, at 104-05.
Id. at 105 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284).
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34, 36).
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to [defendant‟s] secluded cabin near Shell Lake, Wisconsin.”215 The Supreme Court granted certiorari after “[a] divided panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed [defendant‟s]
conviction, finding that the monitoring of the beeper was prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment because its use had violated [defendant‟s] reasonable expectation of privacy.”216 In reversing the Eighth Circuit, thenJustice William Rehnquist, writing for the Court, classified the surveillance at issue as “principally . . . the following of an automobile on public streets and highways.”217 The Court stated, “[a] person travelling in
an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements from one place to another.” 218 Even though
the use of the use of a beeper allowed law enforcement officials to follow
the defendant with more efficacy, that “d[id] not alter the situation.
Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.” 219
As Gray and Citron note, Justice Rehnquist did address the defendant‟s argument that the result of upholding the use of the beeper in
this case “would be that „twenty-four hour surveillance of this country
will be possible, without judicial knowledge or supervision.” 220 However,
rather than agreeing with the proposition that some form of quantitative view of privacy would change the result, Rehnquist expressly reserved judgment on the issue, stating that “if such dragnet type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur,
there will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”221
Despite the rapid advance of technology and capabilities of government surveillance, the day warranting application of different constitutional principles to the use of high-technology surveillance has not
yet come for the Court. In United States v. Jones, Justice Scalia, writing
for the Court, considered arguments based on Knotts and reaffirmed his
commitment to the precedent in light of current technology. 222 However,
215. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277.
216. Id. at 279-80 (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 281.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 282.
220. Id. at 283-284.
221. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284 (emphasis added).
222. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953-54 (2012) (“The Court to date has not
deviated from the understanding that mere visual observation does not constitute a
search.”). Like in Knotts, Justice Scalia punted on the issue of reasonable expectations of
privacy, stating, “[i]t may be that achieving the same result [as constant human surveillance] through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitution-
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the concern expressed in Knotts regarding “dragnet type law enforcement practices” seems to be directed not at law enforcement practices
capable of aggregating a large quantity of information, but rather at
twenty-four hour surveillance that would reveal information that the
Fourth Amendment expressly protects. Thus, in Knotts the Court was
not concerned that the technology allowed for constant tracking, but rather it was significant to the Court that the surveillance did not infringe
on “the traditional expectation of privacy within a dwelling place.”223 To
be sure, had visual surveillance not failed, officers could have observed
the car carrying the barrel of contraband leave the public highway and
arrive at the cabin. Accordingly, the use of the beeper to accomplish the
same end was permissible, because “there [was] no indication that the
beeper was used in any way to reveal information as to the movement of
the drum within the cabin, or in any way that would not have been visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin.” 224
Kyllo supports this view of Fourth Amendment analysis in light of
emerging technology, as the decision there turned on recognized protected privacy rather than notions quantitative rights to privacy. In
Kyllo, the Court considered “whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a street to detect relative amounts of
heat within the home constitutes a „search‟ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.”225
Thus, Kyllo represented another iteration of the Court‟s jurisprudence analyzing use of enhanced surveillance technology. Before considering the issue so presented in Kyllo, the Court had reserved judgment, as it did in Knotts, on just how and when such technologically
enhanced surveillance might implicate the Fourth Amendment in Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States,226 considering whether aerial surveillance of a “2,000 acre plant complex without a warrant was a . . . search
under the Fourth Amendment.227 However, important to the Court in
al invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer that question.”
Id. at 954. However, the fact that the Court could not agree on a proper standard by
which to determine such expectations of privacy when the issue seemed to be squarely
teed up for it is telling, strongly suggesting that the Court likely is hesitant to embrace
the idea of a quantitative right to privacy fully.
223. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282 (emphasis added).
224. Id. at 285.
225. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
226. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
227. Id. at 229, 238-39 (“It may well be, as the Government concedes, that surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed. But the photographs here are not so revealing of intimate details as to raise
constitutional concerns. Although they undoubtedly give the EPA more detailed information than naked-eye views, they remain limited to an outline of the facility‟s buildings
and equipment.”).
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Dow Chemical was the fact that the photographed areas were “not an
area immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened. Nor [was] this an area where Dow ha[d]
made any effort to protect against aerial surveillance.” 228
In confronting the thorny issue of technology‟s effect on expectations of privacy yet again in Kyllo, the Court framed the threshold question as “what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink
the realm of guaranteed privacy.”229 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia held that “[w]here . . . the Government uses a device that is not in
general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously
have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a
„search‟ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.” 230 As
Gray and Citron note, Justice Scalia focused on preventing “police technology [from] erod[ing] the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”231 However, unlike Gray and Citron who argue that Kyllo tracks
a “familiar doctrinal path, invoking the Fourth Amendment to guard
against indiscriminate intrusions that compromise „power to control
what others can come to know‟ about them,”232 Justice Scalia‟s rationale
appears much more limited. Instead, Justice Scalia drew a bright and
“„a firm line at the entrance to the house‟” over which government surveillance could not cross.233 Far from embracing notions of quantitative
rights of privacy, Justice Scalia declared that “[t]he Fourth Amendment‟s protection of the home has never been tied to measurement of
the quality or quantity of information obtained.” 234 In Jardines, Justice
Scalia further illustrated the Fourth Amendment underpinnings of
Knotts and Kyllo by drawing a line at the threshold of the door past
which law enforcement could not cross through the use of sensoryenhancing equipment—e.g., a trained drug dog.235
Accordingly, instead of laying the foundation for the recognition of
a quantitative right of privacy implicated when advancing technology
raises the specter of the surveillance state as Professors Gray and Cit228. Id. at 237 n. 4.
229. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
230. Id. at 40.
231. Id. at 35.
232. Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 175, at 105.
233. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
234. Id. at 37.
235. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (“[W]hen it comes to the
Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals. At the Amendment‟s „very core‟
stands „the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion.‟ This right would be of little practical value if the State‟s agents
could stand in a home‟s porch or side garden and trawl for evidence with impunity.”)
(quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)) (citation omitted)).
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ron argue, Knotts and Kyllo stand for the rather unremarkable proposition that a firm, bright line at the entrance of one‟s home limits the
permissible reach of government technologically-enhanced surveillance.
As such, Judge Pauley‟s admonition that “[t]he collection of breathtaking amounts of information unprotected by the Fourth Amendment does
not transform that sweep into a Fourth Amendment search” appears to
embody a better understanding of the cases relied on by Gray and Citron.236 The focus of the inquiry for Fourth Amendment purposes is not
the quantity or the quality of the information that high-technology surveillance reveals, but rather it is whether access to that information violates “the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.” 237 Accordingly, before engaging in Gray and Citron‟s technology-focused inquiry,
courts must identify a protected interest that the Fourth Amendment
recognizes and that the government surveillance infringes on.
VI. EXAMINING THE SCOPE OF THIRD-PARTY DISCLOSURES:
QUALITATIVE LIMITS ON THE THIRD-PARTY DISCLOSURE
DOCTRINE IN A TECHNOLOGICAL AGE
All of this is not to say that this Article disagrees with notions of
quantitative rights of privacy. Rather, it is meant simply to refute arguments that individual expectations of privacy should turn on the type
of technology used to gather otherwise unprotected information. This
does not mean, however, that the type of technology used to gather information is irrelevant. Indeed, the Court has indicated that technology-enhanced surveillance will infringe on Fourth Amendment protections when such “technology . . . erode[s] the privacy guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment.”238 But where such technology does not intrude on
traditionally guaranteed protections of the Fourth Amendment, the
mere fact that the technology enhances law enforcement capability to
gather evidence is of no moment as far as the Fourth Amendment is
concerned.239 Nonetheless, as Professors Gray and Citron correctly note,
the “concurring opinions [in Jones] indicate that at least five justices
have serious concerns about law enforcement‟s growing surveillance ca236. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
237. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35.
238. Id. at 34.
239. Cf. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986) (“The mere fact
that human vision is enhanced somewhat . . . does not give rise to constitutional problems. An electronic device to penetrate walls or windows so as to hear and record confidential discussions . . . would raise very different and far more serious questions.”); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (“Insofar as respondent‟s complaint appears
to be simply that scientific devices such as the beeper enabled the police to be more effective in detecting crime, it simply has no constitutional foundation. We have never equated
police efficiency with unconstitutionality.”).
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pabilities.”240 The question this Part seeks to answer is how to address
those concurring Justices‟ concerns.
This Article argues that the question to ask for Fourth Amendment
purposes is, ex ante, what people‟s expectations are regarding their privacy in the digital age. Justice Sotomayor framed the question as applied to the facts in Jones: “I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner
that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.” 241 Like Gray and
Citron‟s approach, Justice Sotomayor‟s approach recognizes that the
third-party disclosure rule, in its current form, “is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.” 242
However, unlike Gray and Citron‟s technology-focused test, Justice Sotomayor‟s test remains faithful to what Professor Orin S. Kerr identifies
as “the sequential approach” to the Fourth Amendment.243 Under this
approach “courts take a snapshot of the act and assess it in isolation.” 244
Thus, the Fourth Amendment analysis “requires a frame-by-frame dissection of the scene,”245 asking first whether there has been an infringement of one‟s reasonable expectation of privacy. 246
Accordingly, this Part argues that courts should analyze questions
presented by the NSA bulk telephony metadata collection program and
other similar surveillance schemes under a traditional, sequential
Fourth Amendment rubric. This test first asks, ex ante, what telephone
users‟ reasonable expectations of privacy are when using their phones
in today‟s digital age, thus, establishing a qualitative limit on thirdparty disclosures. Once the court identifies this limit, the court should
then proceed to an analysis similar to the test that Professors Gray and
Citron offer, asking whether the government surveillance technology in
question allows for the discovery information beyond what individual
phone users knowingly disclosed to third parties that would otherwise
be unknowable. If it has, then the surveillance is a Fourth Amendment
“search.”

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 175, at 68.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Kerr, Mosaic, supra note 181, at 315.
Id.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 316-17.
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A. DOCTRINAL FOUNDATION FOR QUALITATIVE LIMITS ON THIRD-PARTY
DISCLOSURES
As discussed in depth above,247 “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”248 Consequently, according to Maryland v. Smith, phone users can
“claim no legitimate expectation of privacy” in the “numerical information [conveyed] to the telephone company.”249 This is because in dialing numbers on a telephone, and thus revealing that information to a
third party, a telephone user “assume[s] the risk that the company
w[ill] reveal to the police the numbers he dialed.”250 According to United
States v. Miller, this is so even if the information revealed to a third
party is “made available to [the third party] for a limited purpose.” 251
Relying on Katz v. United States, the Court in Miller recognized “that a
„search and seizure‟ become[s] unreasonable when the Government‟s activities violate „the privacy upon which [a person] justifiably relie[s]‟”;
however, the Court recognized that Katz “stressed that „[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.‟”252 As such, according to the third-party disclosure
doctrine established in Miller and applied in Smith, disclosures are not
limited by the purpose for which the information is disclosed, but rather
disclosures are limited only by what information a person knowingly
exposes to the public.
This view of third-party disclosures is consistent with the Court‟s
general Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. For instance, in Bond v.
United States,253 the Supreme Court held that held that “a law enforcement officer‟s physical manipulation of a bus passenger‟s carry-on
luggage violated the Fourth Amendment‟s proscription against unreasonable searches.”254 In doing so, the Court recognized that the defendant “expects,” or assumes the risk, “that other passengers or bus employees may move [luggage] for one reason or another.” 255 However, said
the Court, the passenger “does not expect that other passengers or bus
employees will, as a matter of course, feel the [luggage] in an exploratory manner.”256 Thus, by merely exposing an opaque travel bag to the
247. See supra Part I.
248. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
249. Id. at 744.
250. Id. (emphasis added).
251. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
252. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 353 (1967)) (alteration in
original) (emphasis added).
253. Bond v. United States,529 U.S. 334 (2000).
254. Id. at 335.
255. Id. at 337.
256. Id. at 339.
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world of bus passengers and bus employees, the defendant did not by
that act knowingly expose his belongings to “physical manipulation” beyond ordinary handling.257
Similarly, the Court‟s “assumption of risk” line of cases, which provide the foundation for the Court‟s “third-party disclosure” doctrine,
hold that what a person entrusts to a supposed confidant is “not protected by the Fourth Amendment when it turns out that the colleague is
a government agent regularly communicating with the authorities.”258
This is so, because the Fourth Amendment does not “protect[] a wrongdoer‟s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides
his wrongdoing will not reveal it.” 259 However, this result pertains only
to what a person knowingly exposes to the supposed confidant. Thus, in
Gouled v. United States,260 the Court held that a business associate of
the defendant who gained entrance to the defendant‟s home by “pretending to make a friendly call upon the defendant” violated the Fourth
Amendment when he “subsequently and secretly [searched defendant‟s
papers] in his absence.”261
The Court later elaborated on the significance of Gouled in Lewis v.
United States.262 There the Court stated that in Gouled there was “no
difficulty concluding that the Fourth Amendment had been violated by
the secret and general ransacking, notwithstanding” the fact that the
defendant had voluntarily admitted the informant in to his home. 263 In
Lewis, the Court ultimately held that an undercover purchase of marijuana by a government agent in the defendant‟s home did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.264 The Court distinguished the facts of Gouled
by noting “the petitioner invited the undercover agent to his home for
the specific purpose of executing a felonious sale of narcotics.”265 Thus,
the defendant in Lewis, unlike the defendant in Gouled, knowingly exposed his criminal acts to his visitor. Further, noted the Court, the undercover agent did not “see, hear, or take anything that was not contemplated, and in fact intended, by petitioner as a necessary part of his
illegal business.”266 Just as a private person may enter another‟s home
257. Id. at 338-39.
258. E.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971).
259. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (emphasis added).
260. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), abrogated on other grounds by
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
261. Gouled, 255 U.S. 298, abrogated on other grounds by Warden, 387 U.S. at 304,
306.
262. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
263. Id. at 210 (emphasis added).
264. Id. at 209-11.
265. Id. at 210 (emphasis added).
266. Id. (emphasis added).
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for the purposes contemplated by the invitation, “[a] government agent .
. . may accept an invitation to do business and may enter upon the
premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant.”267 However, the scope of the invitation is limited by the subject matter contemplated by the occupant and, where an informant or government
agent seeks information beyond what is contemplated, the Fourth
Amendment is implicated. 268
Concurring in Florida v. Jardines,269 Justice Kagan employed similar reasoning in concluding that abuse of an implied license by government agents “invaded [the] „defendant‟s reasonable expectation of privacy.‟”270 Although agreeing with Justice Scalia‟s treatment of the “case
under a property rubric,” Justice Kagan wrote “to note that [she] could
just as happily have decided it by looking to [the defendant‟s] privacy
interests.”271 Justice Kagan argued that police officers should be prevented from abusing an implied license to approach a home and knock
on the door by “standing in an adjacent place and „trawl[ing] for evidence with impunity,‟” thus “insist[ing] on maintaining the „practical
value‟” of the Fourth Amendment.272 Although focusing, as did the
Court in Kyllo, on the “„firm‟ and . . . „bright‟ line at „the entrance to the
house,‟”273 Justice Kagan‟s concurrence should be read as indicating
that the constitutional problem with the police conduct at issue in
Jardines was that the officers “used a „device . . . not in general public
use‟ . . . to explore details of the home‟” that those officers could not
have discovered from a lawful vantage point—i.e., merely approaching
the defendant‟s door and knocking.274
Although turning on a trespass analysis, Justice Scalia‟s majority
opinion tracks with the analysis of Justice Kagan‟s concurrence. There,
Justice Scalia explained that certain “invitation[s] . . . inhere in the
very act of hanging a knocker.”275 Or, put differently, a person assumes
certain risks by inviting others to knock on his door. Thus, “[t]o find a
visitor knocking on the door is routine (even if sometimes unwelcome);
267. Id. at 211 (emphasis added).
268. See Lewis, 385 U.S. at 211 (“Of course, this does not mean that, whenever entry
is obtained by invitation and the locus is characterized as a place of business, an agent is
authorized to conduct a general search for incriminating materials; a citation to the
Gouled case is sufficient to dispose of that contention.” (citation omitted)).
269. For a discussion on Florida v. Jardines, see supra Part IV.B.
270. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1418 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring)
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)).
271. Id. (Kagan, J., concurring).
272. Id. (Kagan, J., concurring) (first alteration in original) (quoting Florida v.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct.1409, 1414 (2013) (majority opinion)).
273. Id. at 1419. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1419 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001)).
274. See id. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring).
275. Id. at 1416.

228

J. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY LAW

[Vol. XXXI

to spot that same visitor exploring the front path with a metal detector .
. . before saying hello and asking permission, would inspire most of us
to—well, call the police.”276 Indeed, just as the assumption of risk under
the Fourth Amendment is limited by the extent to which a person reveals information to third parties, “[t]he scope of a license—express or
implied—is limited not only to a particular area but also to a specific
purpose.”277 Formed as an assumption of risk analysis, where “the
background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door” to knock,
it can be said that the occupant of the home assumes the risk that police officers at the door will observe possible criminal activity with the
unaided ear or eye.278 However, those same social norms do not allow
officers “to conduct a search.”279
At bottom, under the line of cases discussed above, although it is
well established that people lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in
information knowingly disclosed to third parties, the assumption of risk
doctrine, and the included third-party disclosure doctrine, are not without limits. Indeed, the principle drawn from the above cases is that a
defendant assumes the risk of unauthorized disclosure only as to those
activities and information that a defendant knowingly entrusts to a
third party. Where an informant or undercover government agent discovers information by searching beyond what the defendant knowingly
exposed to the third party, the Fourth Amendment is implicated. The
need to remember the rationale of the third-party disclosure doctrine is
of paramount importance in the digital age because, as the Court noted
most recently in Riley v. California,280 courts must determine whether
the application of a doctrine to a given set of circumstances “would „untether the rule from the justifications underlying . . . ‟” the third-party
disclosure doctrine.281
B. A QUALITATIVE TEST TO GAUGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NSA
BULK TELEPHONY METADATA COLLECTION PROGRAM
In applying a qualitative test to Fourth Amendment issues arising
out of the NSA‟s bulk telephony metadata collection program, courts

276. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416.
277. See Id.
278. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862-63 (2011) (upholding a search
supported by exigent circumstances where officers knocked on defendant‟s door, announcing their presence, and heard what they believed was the destruction of evidence from
within defendant‟s apartment).
279. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416.
280. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
281. Id. at 2485 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009)).
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should ask two questions. First, what do telephone users reasonably
expect, ex ante, to reveal when they disclose numbers dialed to telephone companies. Second, courts should ask if the NSA‟s bulk telephony
mass collection program is capable of exposing information beyond what
telephone users expect to reveal when disclosing numbers dialed to telephone companies. If it is, then courts should rule that the NSA‟s
metadata collection program implicates the Fourth Amendment.
As far as what telephone users reasonably expect ex ante when disclosing numbers dialed to third-party telephone companies, it is clear
that people do not “entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the
numbers they dial.”282 Thus, no matter the technology used, if it discloses only the numbers a person dials, there can be no Fourth Amendment
violation. This is because “all subscribers realize that they must „convey‟
phone numbers to the telephone company” not only to complete the call,
but also so “that the phone company . . . [can] mak[e] permanent records of the numbers they dial.” 283 Similarly, because data obviously collected by telephone companies includes “incoming . . . phone numbers,
call duration, text and data usage,” 284 which is “no more than pen register . . . data,” courts have concluded that telephone users cannot claim a
reasonable expectation of privacy in “„call origination, length, and time
of call.‟”285 Thus, no matter the technology employed, if it discloses only
the numbers a particular person dials, where those calls originated,
how long those calls lasted, and what numbers contacted a person directly, there can be no Fourth Amendment violation.
However, what is less clear is whether telephone users reasonably
expect that the information they disclose to telephone companies will be
compiled with others‟ similarly disclosed information in a manner capable of creating a rich mosaic of social connection, including people who a
particular person might never have been in direct contact with. 286 Indeed, such a rich mosaic goes beyond the first-level of connections that
one reasonably could expect to reveal in their dealings with a thirdparty telephone company and potentially exposes “a wealth of detail
about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”287 To be sure, such great detail is materially different from the
282. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
283. Id.
284. See Zachary Ross, Note, Bridging the Cellular Divide: A Search for Consensus
Regarding Law Enforcement Access to Historical Cell Data, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1185,
1191 (2014).
285. E.g., United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 914 (9th Cir. 2009).
286. See supra Part II (discussing the scope of the NSA‟s bulk telephony metadata
collection program).
287. Cf. United States v. Jones, 132, S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (expressing concern that pervasive GPS monitoring goes beyond what more limited
surveillance could obtain by “generat[ing] a precise, comprehensive record of a person‟s
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information that a “one-time, targeted request for data regarding an individual suspect in a criminal investigation” would produce.288 Indeed, a
particular telephone customer might not even be aware of what such a
program would reveal about her. It is quite conceivable that an individual unwittingly has been in contact with a seemingly innocent associate
who is actually involved in, or similarly unwittingly connected to individuals suspected of, terrorist activity. Such a very real possibility
shows that aggregation of phone records will reveal information beyond
what could be obtained from an individual‟s phone records alone. Accordingly, under the “assumption of risk” cases, it is difficult to say that
simply by using a telephone a particular user invited law enforcement
officers to aggregate that data with other similarly acquired data in order to discover further information regarding associations. 289 One might
say, as Chief Justice John Roberts did in Riley v. California regarding
searches of cell phone data incident to arrest, that to argue the information available through the NSA‟s bulk telephony metadata collection
program is indistinguishable from the information revealed through the
use of a pen register in Smith “is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon.” 290
public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations”).
288. See Klayman v. Obama, No. 1:13-CV-0881, 2013 WL 6598728, at *19 (D.D.C.
Dec. 16, 2013).
289. Cf. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013) (“An invitation to engage in
canine forensic investigation assuredly does not inhere in the very act of hanging a
knocker.”).
Justice Scalia‟s dissent in Maryland v. King, too, is illustrative on this point.
His dissent distinguished the intrusion of an arrestee‟s privacy that certain noninvestigative searches occasion, from investigative searches for evidence of crime “when there is no
basis for believing the [arrestee] is guilty of the crime or in possession of incriminating
evidence.” See generally Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980-90 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The majority in Maryland v. King reasoned that because “[t]he expectations
of privacy of an individual taken into police custody „necessarily [are] of a diminished
scope,” Id. at 1978 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557
(1979)), and because the buccal swab at issue occasioned only “[a] brief intrusion of an arrestee‟s person,” Id. at 1979, the search at issue was “reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. at 1980. Justice Scalia, on the other hand, urged that the type of intrusion that accompany suspicionless searches for the purposes of identification were materially different from the intrusion at issue, which involved the taking of DNA samples to
be “checked against the Unsolved Crimes Collection,” palpably investigative in nature
See Id. at 1985-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Put differently for purposes of analysis, Justice Scalia‟s dissent in Maryland v.
King can be read as arguing that while an arrestee may expect to be subject to certain,
noninvestigative searches upon arrest, it does not follow that the arrestee‟s acknowledged
diminished expectation of privacy, clears the path for even minimally invasive investigative searches aimed at securing possible evidence of yet-to-be-discovered crimes.
290. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014).
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As such, this Article argues that, although individuals cannot
claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial or
the numbers that contact them (“first-level contacts”), it cannot be said
that they, by the simple act of using a phone, assume the risk of exposing a broad mosaic of social connections that reaches telephone users
with whom they have never been in direct contact with.
As to first-level contacts, “[t]he essence of the theory is that by allowing information or records respecting yourself to come into the possession of another private party, you waive privacy rights” and the government is free to discover those contacts. 291 However, the information
discoverable through an aggregation of all telephone users‟ first-level
contact data “differ[s] for a number of reasons.” 292 First, any particular
user does not knowingly reveal anything regarding his or her associations beyond the first-level of contacts. “Moreover, the information in
the form collected is not known by him to exist anywhere nor does he
consent to its compilation.”293 Indeed, there is not necessarily a reason
for any individual telephone customer to know, or even suspect, that the
details a particular first-level contact discloses to a third-party telephone company will then be compiled and used to discover information
beyond what she knowingly disclosed.294 Even in the digital age, where
massive amounts of information are necessarily disclosed to third parties on a daily basis, society recognizes the right of individuals to control what third-parties disclose about them without their prior consent.
For instance, Google allows users to limit what information is collected
and used by third parties, thus empowering users to control the extent
of their own exposure to third-parties.295
Accordingly, when assessing the NSA‟s bulk telephony metadata
collection program, courts should first find that telephone users entertain a reasonable expectation of privacy in any connections they might
have beyond first-level contacts. Indeed, if they do have connections beyond that level, they have manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in those connections by not contacting them directly by phone. Free-

291. See United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 205 (9th Cir. 1978) (Hufstedler, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
292. Id. (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting).
293. Id. (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting).
294. See cf. id. (9th Cir. 1978) (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting) (“There is
no reason for a mail cover suspect to assume that a list of all his correspondents has been
compiled.”).
295. See, e.g., Jack Schofield, Google‟s Privacy Settings—Controlling Your Information, GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2012, 3:59 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/mar/01/google-privacy-settings-controllinginformation.
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dom of association is an essential aspect of a democratic society and, 296
for whatever reason, people might not want third parties or the government to know the extent of their associations. As Professors Gray
and Citron argue, technologies that subvert such manifested expectations of privacy regarding associations threaten “liberty and democratic
culture.”297 Thus, given the ever-increasing importance of technology in
the digital age,298 courts also should recognize that maintaining privacy
in associations beyond those first-level conducts is an expectation of
privacy that society is prepared to recognize in the digital age. 299 As evidence of this societal recognition of an individual‟s right to control the
scope of personal information disclosed to third parties in the digital
age, one need look no further than the various “how to” guides on controlling Internet privacy and the appeal of services marketing enhanced
privacy protection.300 Indeed, enhanced privacy features have become a
selling point for consumers of high-technology products and services.
By way of example, in a recent consumer protection oriented “marketing pitch,” both Apple and Google have “move[d] . . . to put some
smartphone data out of reach of police and the courts.” 301
Courts should then turn to the technology used in a given surveillance program. The question becomes whether the technology at issue
reveals more about a particular individual than could be garnered using
only the first-level contact data disclosed to telephone companies. As
applied to the NSA program, courts should ask whether the NSA bulk
296. Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First
Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 783 (2008).
297. Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 175, at 82 (discussing the “dangers of powerful data aggregation and analysis technologies”); see also Jack M. Balkin,
Essay, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 12 (2008)
(“[M]odern societies ha[ve] become increasingly focused on watching and measuring people in order to control them . . . . Government‟s most important technique of control is no
longer watching or threatening to watch. It is analyzing and drawing connections between
data . . . . [D]ata mining technologies allow the state . . . to record perfectly innocent behavior that no one is particularly ashamed of and draw surprisingly powerful inferences
about people‟s behavior, beliefs, and attitudes.”).
298. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[In] the digital age . . . people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks”).
299. See Klayman v. Obama, No. 1:13-CV-0881, 2013 WL 6598728, at *19 (D.D.C.
Dec. 16, 2013).
300. E.g., Melanie Pinola, A Guide to Google+ Privacy and Information Control,
LIFEHACKER (Aug. 8, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://lifehacker.com/5827683/a-guide-togoogle%252B-privacy-and-information-control (“[O]ne of the main reasons so many people
are interested in [Google+] over Facebook is Google+‟s proclaimed focus on protecting users‟ privacy.”).
301. See Devlin Barrett & Danny Yadron, New Phone Protections Alarm Law Enforcement, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2014, at A1.
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telephony metadata collection goes beyond what would be discoverable
from examination of an individual‟s first-level contacts, thereby infringing on particular telephone user‟s reasonable expectations of privacy.
The focus on technology here is important, because there is no question
as to whether law enforcement officials could manually collect all of the
information disclosed to third-party telephone companies and manually
query it looking for connections to known terrorist numbers. The concern here is that the use of technology-enhanced aggregation techniques
will decrease the cost of such extensive surveillance so as to allow law
enforcement access to information to that which they could not have
otherwise feasibly attained.302
Framed in this manner, the answer to the question applied to the
NSA telephony metadata collection program is straightforward. By its
very terms, the NSA program collects and aggregates telephony
metadata because the aggregation reveals more information than could
be gleaned from looking at individual, first-level contacts in isolation.303
Indeed, the program “is not feasible unless NSA analysts have access to
telephony metadata in bulk, because they cannot know which of the
many phone numbers might be connected until the conduct analysis” of
the aggregate database.304 As the Government admits, limiting analysis
to the first-level contacts of particular telephone users “would impede
the ability to identify a chain of contacts between telephone numbers.”305
Accordingly, if courts recognize a reasonable right to privacy in associations beyond first-level contacts, it is evident that the bulk telephony metadata collection program is capable of discovering information
regarding a particular telephone user beyond that which the user knowingly exposed to a third-party. To be sure, that is the very purpose of
the bulk telephony metadata collection program. As such, the program
cannot be justified under the third-party disclosure doctrine, which is
limited in scope to information that individuals knowingly disclose to a
third-party—i.e., first-level contacts. Thus, courts should find that the
NSA bulk telephony metadata collection program implicates the Fourth
302. See Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 175, at 102 (expressing
concern regarding police surveillance technology that “is capable of broad and indiscriminate . . . by its nature, or is sufficiently inexpensive and scalable so as to present no practical barrier against its broad and indiscriminate use”) (emphasis added)); see also Jones,
132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Traditional surveillance for any extended period
of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken. (emphasis added)).
303. ADMIN. TELEPHONY METADATA WHITE PAPER, supra note 75, at 13 (“NSA employs a multi-tiered process of analyzing the data in an effort to identify otherwise unknown connections between telephone numbers associated with known or suspected terrorists and to other telephone numbers.” (emphasis added)).
304. Id.
305. Id. (emphasis added).

234

J. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY LAW

[Vol. XXXI

Amendment.
It may well be that statutory rather than judicial regulation of
programs like the NSA‟s bulk telephony metadata collection program is
proper. However, as Justice Alito has explained, so long as the legislature fails to act to constrain such practices to comport with the Fourth
Amendment, “the best that [the Court] can do . . . is to apply existing
Fourth Amendment doctrine and ask whether the use of [technologically-enhanced surveillance] in a particular case involve[s] a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.” 306 This
Article argues that, when viewed in light of the Fourth Amendment rubric set forth above, the NSA bulk telephony metadata collection program occasions an intrusion that offends society‟s reasonable expectations of privacy. Thus, despite the fact that the NSA‟s metadata
collection program purportedly comports with the requirements of Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act and is conducted in pursuit of legitimate
law enforcement ends, courts “cannot forgive the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment in the name of law enforcement.”307
This is not to say that such a program, or a program similar to it, is
“barred under the [Fourth] Amendment.”308 Rather, such a program will
comport with the Fourth Amendment only when it is regulated in such
a manner as to prevent invasions “contrary to the command of the
Fourth Amendment.”309 As discussed above, the NSA bulk telephony
metadata collection is not so regulated. Indeed, the broad scope and indefinite duration of the program “permits a[n] . . . invasion . . . by general warrant, contrary to the command of the Fourth Amendment.” 310As
such, in the absence of further statutory regulation, it is for the courts
to ensure that law enforcement officials adhere to the commands of the
Fourth Amendment and allow continuation of the NSA bulk telephony
metadata collection program only if the Government can prove that
special needs justify exemption from the warrant requirement.311

306. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
307. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62 (1967).
308. See id. at 63.
309. See id.
310. See id.; see also Klayman v. Obama, No. 1:13-CV-0881, 2013 WL 6598728, at
*20 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013) (characterizing the NSA bulk telephony metadata collection
program as “almost-Orwellian technology that enables the Government to store and analyze the phone metadata of every telephone user in the United States”).
311. See, e.g., Nat‟l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989) (allowing warrantless drug searches “[i]n light of the extraordinary safety and national security hazards that would attend the promotion of drug users to positions that require the
carrying of firearms or the interdiction of controlled substances”).
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CONCLUSION
In light of the revelations regarding the astounding amount of information the NSA has been aggregating from the telephone networks
of United States citizens, it is indeed time that the Court reexamines
the continued vitality of its third-party disclosure doctrine in the digital
age. The idea that an individual can claim no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties should depend on an individual‟s knowing, voluntary assumption of the risk that
the third party will not keep the information disclosed a secret. However, the Fourth Amendment holds that information not disclosed to those
third parties should remain undiscoverable absent a warrant or some
other exception or excusal from the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. Where the NSA aggregates bulk amounts of telephony
metadata, it is able to discover information about any particular individual that goes beyond what any one of those individuals knowingly
disclosed to a third party. Such discoveries reach past information voluntarily disclosed to third parties to uncover information that would not
otherwise have been ascertainable absent the use of enhanced technology. It simply cannot be that individuals forfeit reasonable expectations
of privacy in information that they themselves did not disclose to third
parties on the basis of an unknown disclosure of that information to a
third party by another individual. 312 Thus, courts should recognize a
reasonable expectation of privacy in an individual‟s associations beyond
first-level contacts and should conclude that the NSA‟s bulk telephony
metadata collection program infringes on that expectation of privacy by
aggregating data in order to discover information not otherwise discoverable from any one particular set of first-level contacts.

312. See, e.g., United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 205 (9th Cir. 1978) (Hufstedler,
J., concurring and dissenting) (questioning whether a recipient of mail forfeits expectations of privacy when the sender choses to convey information to him by mail, because
“the recipient of mail does not knowingly reveal anything”).
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